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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plainti f /-Appellant,
vs.
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY, a corporation
authorized to do business
in the State of Utah,
PACIFIC FINANCE
CORPORATION, a corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah,
Defendant-Respondents.

Case No.
10951

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT,
PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Respondent, Pacific Fin an c e Corporation,
agrees with appellant's statement of the case.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the pretrial order, R. 38, it is stated:
"In addition to the agreements set forth
in the deposition of Mr. Wilkinson the plaintiff will further contend that as far as Pacific
Finance is concerned that the past dealings
1

and past conduct on the part of both the plaintiff and Pacific will have some effect on construing the agreements in question."
Appellant then made a motion for summary
judgment, which is recognized in the Addendum to
Pretrial Order, R.37, upon the ground that there is
no substantial question of fact, there is only a question of law.
Since appellant's assertion concerning the past
conduct of the parties was not a matter put in issue
in the pleadings and was in the form of an offer of
proof in the event of trial, its motion for summary
judgment can only be regarded as an abandonment
of the claim to present extraneous evidence to aid in
the interpretation of the agreements. It is noteworthy that appellant presented no affidavits or evidentiary facts in any form whatsoever to support
this assertion.
Aside from the foregoing matter, respondent,
Pacific Finance Corporation agrees with appellant's
statement except that the trial court granted a sum·
mary judgment in favor of both respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Pacific Finance Corporation, seeks
affirmation of the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, Pacific Finance Corporation, believes the facts as presented by appellant need fur2

ther clarification, although respondent agrees with
the facts insofar as appellant has presented them.
The continuing unconditional guarantee agreement, R.144,145, was a blanket type contract that
was intended by the parties to cover all of the Diamond T sales that would subsequently be turned
over to Pacific Finance. R.154. The conditional
sales contract, R.146,148, between one David Scott
and appellant was assigned to Pacific pursuant to
this blanket agreement. R.15'7.
The president of appellant corporation, who
executed the guarantee agreement in response to a
question as to whose responsibility it was to collect
the amounts due and owing under the conditional
sales contract stated that he had given an unconditional guarantee and if they (Pacific) don't collect
from him, then I have to pay it. R.161. When queried further about the guarantee agreement, he stat..
ed that there is a continuing guarantee agreement
separate from the assignment. R.161.
It should be further pointed out that the so called Assignment and Repurchase Agreement were
simply provisions contained in the standard conditional sales contract used by appellant in the sale of
the trailer and tractor to one David Scott.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE INVOKED BY APPELLANT BECAUSE THE CONTINUING UNCON3

DITIONAL GUARANTE'E CONTRACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
OF ANY CONDUCT BY THE PARTIES WHICH
CREATES AN APP ARENT CONFLICT WITH
THE TERMS OF THE GUARANTEE.
POINT II
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONTINUING
UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE AGREEMENT, APPELLANT IS LIABLE UPON DEMAND OF PAYMENT BY PACIFIC FINANCE,
WITHOUT LIMITATION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE INVOKED BY APPELLANT BECAUSE THE CONTINUING UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE CONTRACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
OF ANY CONDUCT BY THE PARTIES WHICH
CREATES AN APP ARENT CONFLICT WITH
THE TERMS OF THE GUARANTEE.

The doctrine of practical construction cannot
be invoked by appellant because the continuing unconditional guarantee contract is unambiguous and
there is no evidence of any conduct by the parties
which creates an apparent conflict with the terms
of the guarantee.
There are two contracts in evidence before the
court, one is a continuing unconditional guarantee
agreement which incorporates an assignment with
unconditional guarantee. R.144,145. The other is a
conditional sales contract, providing for the sale of
a trailer and tractor to one David Scott, which con·
tains an assignment and repurchase agreement.
4

R.146,148. Appellant contends that there is substantial uncertainty and ambiguity as to which of
these contracts is the agreement between the parties. In essence, appellant argues that by the conduct
of the parties they have demonstrated their meaning and intent to be bound by the provisions in the
conditional sales contract. The alleged past conduct
which appellant claims supports its contention is
not verified by appellant by any reference to the
record, and as previously noted is merely an unsubstantiated assertion by counsel. Respondent, Pacific
Finance vigorously disagrees with appellant's argument and asserts that appellant is attempting to
nullify a continuing unconditional guarantee agreement between the parties, which by its express terms
states that notwithstanding any assignments appearing on any conditional sales contract, the appellant's assignment shall be deemed an unconditional guarantee assignment.
Appellant does not contend that the unconditional guarantee has been terminated or altered, but
on the contrary appears to admit it is a presently
existing agreement. Appellant simply contends that
every significant term in the contract has been abrogated by some form of conduct, of which appellant
has not presented a scintilla of evidence to substantiate.
Appellant has cited Bullough vs. Sims, 16 Utah
2d 304,400 P.2d 20, 22-23 ( 1965) and the cases
cited therein as its authority for its argument. Pa5

cific contends that the Bullough case with its rule
of practical construction is inapplicable in the instant action. The Bullough case states that where
the terms of an agreement are unambiguous, parol
evidence cannot alter or change its plain meaning.
However, there are exceptions to this rule, ''* * * one
of which is that when the parties place their own
construction on it and so perform, the court may
consider this persuasive evidence of what their true
intention was."
In the Bullough case, the court observed that
the parties had demonstrated by their conduct for
twenty eight years their interpretation of the agreement. The court stated:
" 'Appellants correctly claim that this
doctrine of practical construction can only be
applied when the contract is ambiguous, and
cannot be used when the contract is unambiguous. This is undoubtedly a correct general
statement of the law. (Citations omitted).
But the question involved in such cases is ambiguous to whom? ... Thus, even if it be assumed that the words standing alone might
mean one thing to the members of this cour.t,
where the parties have demonstrated by their
actions and performance that to them the contract meant something quite different, the
meaning and intent sho~ld be en~orced .. In
such a si tua ti on the parties by their actions
have created the "ambiguity" required to
. t o opera t'ion. * * *' "
. th e ru 1e m
brmg
Another factor involved in the doctrine is:
"A practical construction of the terms of
6

a contract by the parties thereto implies a
mutual and identical interpretation." Hodges
Irr. Co. vs. Swan Creek Canal Co. 111 Utah
405, 181 P2d 217, 220 (1947).
The doctrine of practical construction is inapplicable in the instant case. In the Bullough case the
court simply found that the parties by their actions
had created an ambiguity and therefore the court
adopted their interpretation of the agreement as
demonstrated by the conduct of the parties over a
period of twenty eight years. Appellant under the
guise of this doctrine is asking the court to hold
that both parties have demonstrated through their
conduct that they intended the unconditional guarantee agreement to be a nullity.
In the instant action, even if Pacific had previously repossessed and delivered the vehicles prior
to seeking recourse on the assignment, this conduct
does not alter the meaning and intent of the parties
as expressed in the unconditional guarantee.
The Assignment With Unconditional Guarantee, R.145, provides: "* * * I guarantee and will
pay assignee or holder upon demand all amounts due
and to become due by the terms of said contract,
* * *" (Emphasis added).
The conduct of repossession and delivery alone
is not significant if respondent had simply not elected to make a demand previously; for appellant was
not obligated to pay prior to demand. However, if
the parties' interpretation of the guarantee agree7

ment as demonstrated by their conduct were that as
a condition precedent to a demand for payment, respondent must repossess and deliver the vehicle
'
there might be an ambiguity, since the guarantee is
unconditional. Appellant has not made this contention; instead it has in effect asserted that the parties have through their conduct abandoned the guarantee agreement and intended to be bound in their
future business transactions by the provisions contained in a single conditional sales contract of one
tractor and trailer. The evidence of such conduct
being an unsubstantiated assertion by counsel for
appellant at the pretrial.
Another factor of significance that militates
against appellant's strained interpretation is the
provision "This unconditional guarantee is continuing in nature until terminated by five days prior
written notice served upon Pacific Finance Corpor·
ation. * * *" R.144.
Appellant has asserted that the language ap·
pearing in a single conditional sales contract be·
tween appellant and David Scott was intended by
the parties to be the determinative document in
controlling their extended business relations, al·
though the parties had entered into a master agree·
ment to regulate their future business transactions,
and Diamond T could have terminated such master
agreement merely by serving a written notice on
Pacific.
8

1

Respondent, Pacific's strongest argument is the
Continuing Unconditional Guarantee Agreement,
itself. R. 144,145.
".I (or we), ?ereby agree that, notwith-

stan~i~ig any assignments appearing on any

?onditwnal sales contract or any other existmg agreements between myself and Pacific
Finance Corporation, my assignments shall
be deemed an unconditional guarantee assignnient on any contract of conditional sale hereafter assigned to and purchased by Pacific
Finance Corporation from me, * * *
"The terms and provisions of this unconditional guarantee assignment shall be the
same as those which * * * appear on the reverse side of this agreement and by this reference is made a part hereof.
* * *" (Emphasis added)
Appellant has asserted that there is a conflict
in the provisions of the two contracts, and therefore,
the court must determine by which contract the parties are bound. The foregoing emphasized language
of the guarantee agreement clearly indicates that
the parties realized that there might be language in
the assignment clauses of individual conditional sales
contracts which would be at variance with the unconditional guarantee and therefore they expressly
stated their intent as to the agreement by which they
should be bound.
The statement in Ephraim Theatre Company
vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P2d 221, 223 (1958)
is applicable in the instant case:
9

.
''In consid~ring the controversy here it
IS well to keep m mind the fundamental concepts _in regard to contracts; that their purpose Is to reduce to writing the conditions
upon which the minds of the parties have met
and to fix their rights and duties in respect
thereto. The intent so expressed is to be found
if possible, within the four corners of the in~
strument itself in accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning of the words used. Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language so that the meaning is confused, or
is susceptible of more than one meaning, there
is no justification for interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources. It would
defeat the very purpose of formal contracts
to permit a party to invoke the use of words
or conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove
that the parties did not mean what they said
or to use such inconsistent words or conduct
to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity
where none would otherwise exist. Generally
speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court
has any right to ignore or modify conditions
which are clearly expressed merely because it
may subject one of the parties to hardship,
but they must be enforced 'in accordance with
the intention as * * * manifested by the Ian·
guage used by the parties to the contract'."
Although it is respondent, Pacific's contention
that there is no uncertainty or ambiguity which
would justify an interpretation from extraneous
sources as to the intent of the parties to the guarantee agreement; there is significant testimony as to
the intent of Oral J. Wilkinson, the President of
appellant, who executed the guarantee.
10

"Q.

I ~ake it tp~n y~u have had an agreement
with Pacific Fmance for some time to
purchase your contracts?
A. Since about 1959 or '8, along in there.
Q. You mentioned to me a few minutes ago
that this was under a contract which you
had with Pacific Finance, which I understand it is a blanket type contract that
would cover almost all of your sales that
you would subsequently turn over to Pacific Finance?
A. Yes. It is a guarantee by the corporation
and then a guarantee by myself to repurchase the paper if it is not paid out by
the individual.
Q. That is the contract that you are trying
to locate here now, is it?
A. Yes." R.154, lines 18-30; R.155, line 1.

***

"Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Do you recall if this conditional sales contract was subsequently assigned or sold
to Pacific Finance?
Yes, it was.
And was this pursuant to this contract
that you had with them?
You mean fallowing that contract, was it
under that agreement?
Yes, under that agreement.
Yes." R.157, lines 15-23.

***

I noticed on the conditional sale contract
that there is no assignment as such.
11

Would it be correct to state that there
was a separate assignment agreement
that was entered into?
A.

Yes. That was part of this agreement
that I am trying to locate." R.160, lines
19-23.

***

"Q.

I take it from what you have indicated
to me that if the Pacific Finance gets the
contract, gets the conditional sale contract, and I suppose they receive the title
too, it is their responsibility to collect the
amounts due and owing under the contract?

A.

I give them an unconditional guarantee
and if they don't collect from him, then I
have to pay it.
Q. Do you have a copy of that guarantee
agreement?
A. That is all in one agreement.
Q. Is it still in the same agreement we are
talking about?
A. Yes. There is a personal continuing guarantee agreement separate from the assignment; but there are two, one corporate and one personal." R.161, lines 8-20.
Appellant has shown no grounds upon which to
invoke the doctrine of practical construction in the
instant case. The facts of Bullough vs. Sims are entirely different for there the court simply admitted
evidence of the conduct of the parties to determine
what they meant and intended their agreement to
be. In the instant action, the appellant has attempt·
12

ed to use the doctrine to interpret the continuing
guarantee out of existence. The guarantee agreement is clear and unambiguous and has by its express terms stated in case of a conflict such as here
which contract provisions are controlling. There is
no basis for appellant to introduce extraneous evidence in the interpretation of the guarantee contract. Respondent contends that in the instant case
the language of Clyde vs. Eddington Canning Co.,
10 Utah 2d 14, 347 P2d 563 (1959) is controlling.

"* * * Under the clear language of the
writing we are not impressed with such contention, particularly since intentions cannot
vary the terms of clear, concise, unambiguous
language employed by him who says he did
not intend what he said."
POINT II
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONTINUING
UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE AGREE MENT, APPELLANT IS LIABLE UPON DEMAND OF PAYMENT BY PACIFIC FINANCE,
WITHOUT LIMITATION.

Under the terms of the continuing unconditional guarantee agreement, appellant is liable upon demand of payment by Pacific Finance, without limitation.
The continuing unconditional guarantee agreement between Diamond T and Pacific Finance, under which the conditional sales contract of David
Scott was assigned, constitutes an absolute undertaking on the part of appellant to pay all amounts
due or to become due under the contract, together
13

with all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing said contract on collecting or attempting to collect money thereunder. R.145. The agreement further provides :

.
"* *. * and I agree to delay or indulgence
m enforcmg payment, and to the release, surrender or substitution of collateral; diligence,
presentment, protest and demand notice of
sale and notice of every kind are hereby waived, all without affecting the liability of the
undersigned hereunder. * * *"
There was also in effect at the time of the assignment of the conditional sales contract to Pacific,
an insurance agreement. ( R.14 7) , whereby appellant agreed that all conditional sales contracts purchased by Pacific from appellant would be covered
for the term thereof with insurance in such types
and amounts as set forth. Under the terms and con·
ditions of this insurance agreement, Pacific did not
have a duty to purchase insurance.
It is Pacific's position that since it had no duty
to furnish insurance, and under the unconditional
guarantee agreement, the appellant remained liable
to Pacific, even if Pacific completely released the
collateral securing the conditional sales contract as·
signed to respondent, Pacific was entitled to judg·
ment as a matter of law.
The nature of a guaranty was described by the
court in Rucker vs. Republic Supply Company,
Okla., 415 P2d 951, 953, 954 (1966) in the follow·
ing language :
14

"A guaranty is deemed continuing if it
c.on~emplates a future course of dealings, not
limited to a single transaction for an indefinite period of time, * * * or until it is revoked
* * *. A continuing guaranty is deemed a
repetition of the extension of credit so long
as it is enforced. Liability under a continuing
guarantee will be deemed to have continued
until revoked where it contains no express
limitation as to duration of Guarantor's responsibility, 24 Am. Jr. Guaranty, Sec. 63
and 38 C.J.S. Guaranty, §53. A guaranty is
deemed unconditional unless its terms import
a condition precedent to liability, (Citations
Omitted).
"The intent of the parties to a guaranty
is to be collected from the whole instrument,
(Citations Omitted). Where the language of
a contract of guaranty is clear and explicit,
its purpose and meaning must be ascertained
therefrom, without resort to extrinsic evidence, (Citations Omitted).

***
"* * * this court has frequently held that

in construing a guarantee to determine the intent of the parties, it should be taken rrwst
strongly against the Guarantor and in favor
of the Creditor, (Citations Omitted)." (Emphasis added).
Also see Hallstrom vs. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111,
114, 378 P2d 355 (1963).
In the United States vs. Anderson, 366 F2d
569,571 (1966, C.A. 10th), the court observed:
"'The law is well settled that a guaranty
is a collateral agreement to pay a debt or perform a duty for another in case of default
15

which may be enforced separately from the
primary obligation. It is not necessary to proceed against the primary debtor. An unconditional guaranty is one whereby the guarantor agrees to pay or perform a contract upon
default of the principal without limitation.
It is an absolute undertaking to pay a debt
at maturity or perform an agreement if the
principal does not pay or perform. * * *"
In the instant action appellant has attempted
to engraft all types of limitations upon its unconditional guarantee agreement. Appellant has contended that Pacific must first proceed against the primary debtor by obtaining possession and delivery
of the security, before seeking payment. Appellant
has further disclaimed liability under the guarantee
because Pacific did not procure insurance on the
vehicle or store it properly. As respondent Pacific
has already contended, since it was empowered to
release completely the security under the guarantee
agreement, appellant's contentions that Pacific was
compelled to fulfill these other obligations prior to
seeking payment is without merit.
Where the guaranty is an absolute one, it is not
a defense to the guarantor that the creditor has been
negligent in regard to protecting and enforcing collateral security. 38 CJS Guaranty, §81, p. 1251; Nation Wide Inc. vs. Scullin, 256 F. Supp. 929, 932,
933 (1966 D.C.D. N.J.); A. & T. Motors, Inc. vs.
Roemelmeyer, Florida, 158 So. 2d 567, 570 (1964);
United States vs. Klebe Tool & Die Co., 5 Wis. 2d
392, 92 NW2d 868, 871 (1958).
16

The reasoning supporting this rule is that the
rights and liabilities are fixed by the contract of
guaranty. The risk of the guarantor is not increased
where the obligation is absolute and unconditional;
and by its terms the creditor may make an entire
release of the security and still recover from the
guarantor. Therefore, regardless of any negligence
on the part of the creditor, he is entitled to recover
on an absolute guaranty; for upon default of the
principal, the guarantor is immediately liable.
There are two cases from the Tenth Circuit
which clearly illustrate this point:
Joe Heaston Tractor & Imp. Co. vs. Securities
Acceptance Corp., 243 F2d 197 (1957, CA 10th).

In this case, Securities Acceptance, a finance
company sued Heaston, the guarantor upon a contract which guaranteed payments due to the finance
company from one Claussen, the debtor. The guarantor sold an appliance store, along with certain indebtedness of the guarantor to the finance company.
The debtor needed financing in order to complete
the transaction. To induce the finance company to
furnish the necessary financing, the guarantor "unconditionally guaranteed" the payments of all accounts then owed by the debtor to the finance company and those to be incurred in the future. The
finance company made loans to the debtor and took
back chattel mortgages, which were never filed. The
debtor was adjudicated bankrupt. The finance company demanded payment from the guarantor in ac17

cordance with the guaranty agreement. The guaran.
tor pleaded that since the finance company failed to
perfect the liens, the subrogation rights of the guar.
antor were lost, and the guarantor was released
from its obligation.
The court stated:
"The contract of guaranty makes reference to secured loans but it does not specific.
ally require the taking of mortgages or that
the same, if taken, be recorded. Relying upon
the law of suretyship as propounded in
Stearns on Law of Suretyship, 5th Ed., 188,
§6.49, and 50 Am. Jur., Suretyship, §118, the
Guarantor contends that the contract contemplates that security for loans will be taken
and that in such cases there is an implied
agreement that the lien of the security will
be preserved by proper filing or recording, a
failure of which relieves a guarantor to the
extent of the loss sustained. We are of the
opinion that the guaranty agreement is an
absolute and unconditional guaranty and the
foregoing rule of law has no application.

"It is quite clear that the agreement cov·
ered every kind of retail sale upon which the
Finance Company advanced money. It spe·
cifically guarantees, without limitation or
condition, the prompt performance by the
Debtor of all obligations and commitments to
the Finance Company with respect to all re·
tail paper by endorsement, or otherwise. Full
power was granted to the Finance Company
to modify or change the terms of any of the
liabilities and to release any collateral there·
to Under the broad terms of this guaranty
18

agreement, the Debtor and the Finance Company were free to handle their commercial
pape~ as they saw fit. We think the guaranty
was mtended to cover, without condition, all
good-faith loans made to the Debtor by the
Finance Company in connection with the Debtor's appliance business in which commercial
paper was taken. Otherwise there would have
been no reason to include in the contract the
provision that the Guarantor 'unconditionally
guarantees * * *, the due and punctual payment' of all notes evidencing floor plan financing transactions and 'further guarantees
the prompt performance' of all obligations and
commitments of the Debtor under any 'endorsement to or repurchase agreement executed by the Dealer to the Finance Company
with respect to any retail paper. * * *' The
record does not disclose what the security requirements are or what the custom is under
general floor plan arrangements. Presumably
they would differ in individual cases.
"... A definition of conditional and unconditional contracts of guaranty and the liability of guarantors under them is well stated
by this Court in Pavlantos vs. Garoufalis, 89
F2d 203, 206, where it is said:
'Contracts of guaranty are divided
into two kinds. One is absolute or unconditional and the other is conditional. An
absolute guarantee is an unconditional
undertaking on the part of the guarantor
that the person primarily obligated will
make payment or perform, and such guarantor is liable immediately upon default
of the principal without notice. A conditional guaranty is an undertaking to pay
19

or perform if. payment or performance
c.annot be obtamed from the principal ob.
hgor by reasonable diligence. * * * (Citing
cases) An absolute guaranty unlike a
conditional one, casts no duty upon the
creditor or holder of the obligation to at.
tempt collection from the principal debtor
before looking to the guarantor. (Ci ta·
tions omitted) Both presuppose default
by the principal.'
"The guaranty was not gratuitous. The
Trial Court found the guaranty was necessary to enable the Debtor to finance the pur·
chase of the business. At the time the Guarantor sold the appliance business to the Debtor, there was owing to the Finance Company
approximately $35,000. As an integral part
of the sale, the Guarantor, by its guaranty,
induced the Finance Company to extend floor
plan financing to the Debtor and to continue
loans which had been assumed by the Debtor
on the purchase of the business. Considering
the contract as a whole, the purpose for which
it was given, together with all the surround·
ing circumstances existing at the time the
guaranty was executed, we think it was the
intention of the contracting parties that upon
default the Guarantor was unconditionally
bound to pay the liabilities of the Debtor as
described in the guaranty instrument."
The second case is precisely in point and deals
with the issue of whether it was negligent of the
creditor not to procure insurance on the security
after the debtor had allowed the policy to lapse.
United States vs. Newton Livestock Auction
Market, Inc., 336 F2d 673 ( 1964, CA 10th).
20

In this case the Small Business Administration
(S.B.A.), an agency of the United States, lent
money to Newton Livestock Auction Market, Inc.,
(Newton) which was secured by mortgages on Kansas real and chattel property and by three separate
guaranty agreements. The government sued to foreclose the mortgage and joined as defendants Newton
and the guarantors. After the judgment of foreclosure, but prior to the sale, the property was damaged
by a severe windstorm.
The mortgages required Newton to insure the
property. After the foreclosure action was brought
Newton notified the insurance carrier that it could
not pay a premium due. The insurer notified the
S.B.A., who replied by letter that the policy should
lapse. The termination of the policy occurred more
than six months before the storm damage. The mortgage provided that if the mortgagor did not keep
the property insured, the United States as mortgagee had the option to effect insurance, and the
cost incurred was an additional lien against the
property. The trial court credited against the judgment obtained by the S.B.A. the $30,000 storm damage. The appellate court observed that the positions
of the mortgagor and guarantors are different and
require different treatment.
Newton asserted that the United States undertook to insure the property and thereby became liable to it. The court stated that all the S.B.A. did
21

was to elect to bear the risk of possible loss of its
security. The court stated at page 677:
!
'''The statutory power of S.B.A. to insure
and ~harge the co~t to the mortgagor did not
reqmre S.B.A. to msure for the benefit of the
mortgagor. The policies lapsed when Newton
failed to pay the premiums; the S.B.A. was
~nder no obligation to insure; and it did noth·
mg more than assume the hazard of impair·
ment in value of its collateral. Newton the
mortgagor, is entitled to no credit on the fudgment because of the storm loss.
"On the theory of increased risk the \
guarantors contend that they were released, i
either fully or to the extent of the storm darn· 1
age, by the action of the United States in per·!
mitting the insurance to lapse. Their reliance
on 'equities' and general principles of law are
unpersuasive because their rights and liabilities are fixed by the contracts of guaranty.
The risk of the guarantors was not increased
because their obligations were absolute and
unconditional. By the terms of the guaranty
contracts S.B.A. could have made an entire
release of the security for the loan and still
have recovered from the guarantors. Lack of
notice of mortgagor's default in its obligation
to insure is important because the guarantors
expressly waived notice of any default by the
mortgagor. The guarantors have failed to
show the breach of any duty owed to them.
They have no right to a credit because of the
storm damage."
The foregoing cases clearly illustrate the nature
of an unconditional guarantee, and the appellant
cannot under the terms of the guarantee agreement
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it executed impose conditions or duties upon Pacific
in order to disclaim liability.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant has claimed in its conclusion that if
Pacific had the ownership interest when the vehicle
was stolen, Diamond T had no liability prior to the
return of the vehicle. Under the continuing unconditional guarantee agreement the ownership would
be irrelevant, since Pacific was empowered to release the security completely. The trial court properly interpreted a clear, concise, unambiguous document, the guarantee agreement, without the aid
of extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, there was no
relevant evidence of record before the court indicating any ambiguity demonstrated by the conduct of
the parties. On the other hand, there were statements af record by the president of appellant that
the conditional sales contract of David Scott was
assigned to Pacific pursuant to the guarantee agreement. Appellant by its execution of the guarantee
agreement undertook an absolute obligation to pay
upon default of the principal without limitation.
The trial court properly concluded that appellant
had not stated a cause of action against Pacific Finance Corporation.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR.
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent
Pacific Finance Corp.
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